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KRUPSKI AND RELATION BACK FOR CLAIMS 
AGAINST JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS 
Meg Tomlinson* 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C) governs amendments that 
change the party or naming of a party in a pleading after the statute of 
limitations has run.  Many courts have found amendments identifying 
defendants previously named as John Doe to be outside the scope of the rule, 
holding that a lack of knowledge does not constitute a mistake under Rule 15.  
In 2010, however, the U.S. Supreme Court refocused the relation back 
inquiry on what the party to be brought in by amendment knew or should 
have known within the limitations period—away from what the plaintiff knew 
or should have known at the time of filing the complaint.  In light of that 
decision, a number of federal district courts have reinterpreted Rule 15(c) 
and have begun to allow relation back for claims against John Doe 
defendants when the requirements of Rule 15(c) are met.  This Note examines 
relation back for claims against John Doe defendants and concludes that this 
new approach is supported by the Supreme Court’s relation back doctrine as 
well as the text and purpose of Rule 15(c), and it avoids the tension with Rule 
11 that the John Doe rule creates. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On January 30, 2014, Michael Hagen’s widow, Tiffany Hagen, filed a 
complaint on behalf of her late husband’s estate after he was beaten to death 
by his cellmate at the Snake River Correctional Institute (SRCI).1  Hagen’s 
cellmate was a member of a white supremacist gang that had repeatedly 
threatened him.2  The complaint alleged that, despite Hagen’s numerous 
attempts to inform prison officials that he was being targeted by the gang, the 
officials failed to help him.3  Instead, they repeatedly sent him to solitary 
confinement; once for refusal to comply with orders to return to his cell where 
a cellmate that had threatened him was waiting and again for an altercation 
arising out of the conflict with the gang.4  During his second stay in solitary 
confinement, Hagen was told that he would be transferred to another prison 
after the stay was completed.5  Instead, he was forced to return to general 
population and once again share a cell with a member of the white 
supremacist gang.6  The following day, Hagen was found beaten and 
unconscious in his cell and died the next day from blunt force injuries to his 
head.7  Hagen’s murder was the second inmate-on-inmate homicide at SRCI 
within a year.8 
After Hagen’s death, Tiffany requested information from the Oregon 
Department of Corrections (DOC), the DOC’s counsel, and the District 
Attorney’s Office to discover the identities of those involved in the incident, 
but all cited an the ongoing investigation and refused to provide the 
 
 1. Hagen v. Williams, No. 14-CV-00165, 2014 WL 6893708, at *1 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 2014). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Complaint at 5–6, Hagen, 2014 WL 6893708 (No. 14-CV-00165). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 7. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See id. at 5. 
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information.9  She later filed civil rights claims against a number of named 
supervisors and “John Doe” DOC employees at SRCI.  She alleged violations 
of Hagen’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment on the ground that DOC officials knew of the violence at SRCI 
and failed to prevent it.10  After filing the complaint, Tiffany Hagen learned 
the identities of the individual officers through discovery.11  By this point, 
however, the statute of limitations on the claims had expired, and when she 
moved to amend her complaint to identify the previously unnamed officers, 
the court held that the claims were time-barred as Tiffany’s lack of 
knowledge of the officers’ identities at the time of filing did not constitute a 
mistake under Rule 15(c).12 
This Note examines whether an amendment identifying a John Doe 
defendant can relate back to the original complaint under Rule 
15(c)(1)(C)(ii).  That is, after the statute of limitations has expired, can a 
plaintiff amend the complaint to add the real names of defendants previously 
identified as John Doe?  Courts considering the question have commonly 
found that such amendments are barred by the statute of limitations.13  Many 
courts reach the same conclusion reached by the court in Hagen:  even if the 
prospective defendant had notice of the action within the period for service 
of the complaint, the amendment does not relate back to the original 
complaint because a lack of knowledge of a prospective defendant’s identity 
is not a “mistake concerning the proper party’s identity” under Rule 
15(c)(1)(C)(ii).14  This approach is known as the John Doe rule.15 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A.,16 
however, offers a better approach.  Although Krupski did not involve John 
Doe defendants, it focused the inquiry under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) on whether 
the prospective defendant knew or should have known it would have been 
named as a defendant in the original action but for a mistake concerning its 
identity, and away from what the plaintiff knew or should have known at the 
time the complaint was filed.17  In response to Krupski, a number of federal 
district courts have changed their approach and now allow relation back for 
claims against John Doe defendants when the other requirements of Rule 
15(c) have been met.18 
Scholars and courts alike have long noted the strong policy arguments in 
favor of an amendment to Rule 15(c) that allows relation back for claims 
 
 9. Hagen v. Williams, No. 14-CV-00165, 2014 WL 6893708, at *4 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 2014). 
 10. See Complaint, supra note 3, at 8. 
 11. Hagen, 2014 WL 6893708, at *5. 
 12. Id. at *5–6. 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
 14. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii); infra Part II.A. 
 15. Cheatham v. City of Chicago, No. 16-cv-3015, 2016 WL 6217091, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 
Oct. 25, 2016). 
 16. 560 U.S. 538 (2010). 
 17. Id. at 548. 
 18. See infra note 221 and accompanying text. 
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against John Doe defendants.19  Some have argued for a broader 
interpretation of Rule 15(c)’s mistake requirement even before Krupski 
shifted the relation back inquiry from the plaintiff’s knowledge to the 
defendant’s knowledge.20  Others have acknowledged the ambiguity Krupski 
created with respect to relation back for claims against John Doe defendants21 
or have argued that the decision suggests that Rule 15(c) should not be 
interpreted to preclude amendments identifying John Doe defendants.22  This 
Note builds on that scholarship by examining recent applications of Krupski 
in the context of relation back for claims against John Doe defendants.  It 
argues that, in light of Krupski, courts should interpret Rule 15(c) to allow 
relation back for claims against John Doe defendants where the prospective 
defendant had timely notice of the action and knew or should have known 
that it was not named because the plaintiff lacked knowledge concerning its 
identity. 
Part I examines the balance struck between relation back and statutes of 
limitations, as well as the use of John Doe pleading in federal court.  Next, 
Part II describes courts’ approaches to relation back for claims against John 
Doe defendants prior to the 2010 Krupski decision.  Part III then describes 
the majority and minority approaches to this question after Krupski.  It 
examines the textual, precedential, and purpose-based arguments in favor of 
each approach.  Finally, Part IV of this Note argues that the minority’s 
 
 19. See Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 202 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001) (arguing 
that an amendment to Rule 15(c) allowing relation back in the event of a mistake or lack of 
information concerning the identity of the proper party would bring the rule more in line with 
the policies underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Rebecca S. Engrav, Relation 
Back of Amendments Naming Previously Unnamed Defendants Under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15(c), 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1549, 1552–53 (2001) (arguing that the language of Rule 
15(c) should be changed to allow relation back when the plaintiff did not know the identity of 
the correct defendant); Howard M. Wasserman, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and John Doe 
Defendants:  A Study in 1983 Procedure, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 799 (2003) (arguing for a 
procedural mechanism for § 1983 claims that allows a potential civil rights plaintiff to obtain 
formal discovery from the government prior to filing a suit and before the statute of limitations 
expires); Brian J. Zeigler et al., A Change to Relation Back, 18 TEX. J. ON C.L & C.R. 181, 
182–83 (2013) (arguing for an exception to Rule 15 in excessive force cases only). 
 20. Steven S. Sparling, Relation Back of “John Doe” Complaints in Federal Court:  What 
You Don’t Know Can Hurt You, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1235, 1238–39 (1997) (arguing that 
Rule 15(c) preserves § 1983 claims against John Doe defendants where the plaintiff lacked 
knowledge of the proper party’s identity). 
 21. Edward F. Sherman, Amending Complaints to Sue Previously Misnamed or 
Unidentified Defendants After the Statute of Limitations Has Run:  Questions Remaining from 
the Krupski Decision, 15 NEV. L.J. 1329, 1344–47 (2015); Heather Zinkiewicz, Navigating 
the Course of Relation Back:  Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A. and Standardizing the 
Relation-Back Analysis, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1197, 1211–12 (2011); Stacy H. Farmer, 
Comment, The United States Supreme Court in Krupski v. Costa Crociere, S.p.A. Creates 
Additional Ambiguity in the Relation Back Doctrine, 35 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 207, 215–16, 
224–26 (2011) (noting that Krupski has created confusion in relation back doctrine and arguing 
that the decision should be construed broadly). 
 22. Robert A. Lusardi, Rule 15(c) Mistake:  The Supreme Court in Krupski Seeks to 
Resolve a Judicial Thicket, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 317, 338 (2011) (arguing that, after 
Krupski, reading Rule 15(c) as barring John Doe amendments is not supported by the text or 
the purpose of the Rule). 
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rejection of the John Doe rule is supported by the text of Rule 15(c), Supreme 
Court precedent, and the purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
I.  A BALANCING ACT:  RELATION BACK, 
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS, AND JOHN DOE PLEADING 
This Part examines relation back under Rule 15, the connection between 
relation back and statutes of limitations, and John Doe pleading.  Part I.A.1 
explores the requirements for relation back under Rule 15(c), and Part I.A.2 
describes the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the rule in Krupski.  Part I.B 
examines the connection between relation back and statutes of limitations.  
Part I.C explores the history and use of John Doe pleading. 
A.  Rule 15 and Relation Back 
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to amend a 
pleading to add or change a claim or party in the original complaint.23  
Depending on the circumstances, parties can amend pleadings as a matter of 
course, with the opposing party’s consent, or with leave of the court.  The 
rule instructs courts that they should “freely give leave [to amend] when 
justice so requires.”24  This guidance reflects the Rules’ commitment to the 
notion that a claim should be decided on its merits rather than on the basis of 
mere technicalities.25  In this respect, Rule 15 is emblematic of the shift from 
the common law regime, which rarely allowed amendments to pleadings, to 
a notice pleading system, which generally only requires that pleadings place 
parties on notice of the nature of and the basis for the claims or defenses 
asserted.26 
Rule 15(c)(1)(C) governs amendments changing parties or the naming of 
parties after the relevant statute of limitation has expired.  The Rule states 
that an amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading when: 
[T]he amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against 
whom a claim is asserted if [the amendment asserts a claim or defense that 
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted 
to be set out—in the original pleading] and if, within the period provided 
by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be 
brought in by amendment: 
(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in 
defending on the merits; and 
(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought 
against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.27 
 
 23. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1)–(2). 
 24. Id. r. 15(a)(2). 
 25. 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1471, at 587 
(3d ed. 2010). 
 26. Id. § 1471, at 584–85. 
 27. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c). 
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This subsection is viewed as having three separate requirements:  the notice 
requirement, the change-of-parties requirement, and the knowledge-of-
mistake requirement.28 
1.  Rule 15(c):  Notice, Change of Parties, 
and Knowledge-of-Mistake Requirements 
The requirement that the defendant receive adequate notice of the original 
action has been described as the “linchpin” of relation back.29  This 
requirement is set forth in Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(i), which requires that the party 
to be brought in by amendment receive adequate notice of the action within 
the period for service under Rule 4(m).30  Rule 4(m) requires service of 
summons and the complaint within ninety days of filing.31  Thus, Rule 
15(c)(1)(C) requires a defendant to be brought into an action to have received 
notice of the action within ninety days of the filing of the original complaint 
such that it will not suffer prejudice in defending against the claim on its 
merits.32 
Notice of the action need not be formal, so long as it is sufficient to ensure 
that the party will not be prejudiced in defending against the claims 
asserted.33  Formal notice often comes from service of the complaint,34 but 
informal notice can take a variety of forms.  Some courts require the 
prospective defendant to have actual awareness of the suit.35  For example, 
in Lembach v. Indiana,36 the court held that, despite the fact that individual 
corrections officers may have been aware of the facts underlying an inmate’s 
civil rights claim, the amendment adding them as parties did not relate back, 
because Rule 15 required that they have notice of the suit itself.37 
Other courts, however, have allowed constructive or imputed notice.38  
Constructive notice—also known as implied notice—is often found when the 
circumstances surrounding the commencement of litigation suggest that the 
prospective defendant had reason to expect his potential involvement.39  In 
 
 28. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 1498 
 29. Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986); see also Lacedra v. Donald W. Wyatt 
Det. Facility, 334 F. Supp. 2d 114, 128 (D.R.I. 2004). 
 30. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(i). 
 31. Id. r. 4(m). 
 32. Prior to Rule 15(c)’s amendment in 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the 
notice requirement to require notice of the action within the statute of limitations.  Schiavone, 
477 U.S. at 31.  In 1991, the Advisory Committee amended the rule to make clear that notice 
must be received within the period for service set forth in Rule 4(m), not within the limitations 
period. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(3) advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment.  The Advisory 
Committee explicitly stated that the rule had been revised to change the result in Schiavone. 
Id. 
 33. FED. R. CIV. P. 15 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment. 
 34. See Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 374 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 35. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 1498.1, at 138 & n.15. 
 36. 987 F. Supp. 1095 (N.D. Ind. 1997). 
 37. Id. at 1104. 
 38. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 1498.1, at 138–41, 141 n.16; see, e.g., Davis v. 
Corr. Med. Sys., 480 F. Supp. 2d 754, 761 (D. Del. 2007). 
 39. See Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 195 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc.,40 for example, the Third Circuit found that 
a prospective defendant had sufficient notice of the action when he 
coincidentally saw a copy of a complaint describing the incident giving rise 
to the action and naming his employer and “unknown employee” as 
defendants.41 
Notice can also be imputed from the originally named party to the party to 
be added by amendment.42  Notice can be imputed when a prospective 
defendant shares an identity of interest with a named defendant or when a 
prospective defendant and a named defendant share counsel.43  Parties have 
an identity of interest when their business operations or other activities are so 
closely related that the commencement of an action against one provides 
notice of the litigation to the other.44  In Schiavone v. Fortune,45 the Supreme 
Court validated this method of imputing interest, finding that, when the 
complaint provided timely notice to the original defendant, notice can be 
imputed to a sufficiently related defendant added by amendment.46 
The shared-attorney method permits imputation of notice to a prospective 
defendant who is represented by the same attorney as the originally named 
defendant.47  This theory recognizes that the attorney for the named 
defendant is likely to discuss with the prospective defendant the likelihood 
that he may be joined in the action, thus providing the prospective defendant 
with notice of both the action and his potential involvement.48  The fact of 
shared counsel is sometimes viewed as simply demonstrating an identity of 
interest with the originally named party, but courts generally treat the two as 
separate methods of imputing notice.49 
Rule 15(c)(1)(C) is also viewed as having a change-of-parties requirement, 
as the rule governs relation back of amendments that “change[] the party or 
the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted.”50  Courts differ in 
their interpretations of this subsection.  Some courts interpret the change-of-
parties requirement narrowly and allow only the correction of misnomers or 
substitutions of one party for another—not the addition of new parties.51  
 
 40. 550 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 41. Id. at 175. 
 42. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 1498.1, at 138–51. 
 43. See Singletary, 266 F.3d at 195–99. 
 44. Id. at 197. 
 45. 477 U.S. 21 (1986). 
 46. Id. at 29. 
 47. Singletary, 266 F.3d at 197. 
 48. Id. at 196. 
 49. Id. at 197. 
 50. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C); see also 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 1498.2. 
 51. See, e.g., Stewart v. Bureaus Inv. Grp., LLC, 309 F.R.D. 654, 659–60 (M.D. Ala. 
2015) (“[T]he plain language of Rule 15 advises that amendments relate back only when ‘the 
plaintiff redirect[s] an existing claim toward a different party, and drop[s] the original party’” 
(second and third alterations in original) (quoting Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. Power, No. CV 07-
01311-PHX-NVW, 2011 WL 5024239, at *3 (D. Ariz. Oct. 21, 2011))); Stew Farm, Ltd. v. 
Nat. Res. Conservation Serv., 967 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1175–76 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (holding that 
relation back is unavailable to amendments naming additional defendants, rather than simply 
correcting a misnomer or substituting parties). 
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Other courts adopt a broader interpretation that permits amendments that add 
or drop parties.52 
The final requirement under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) is that the party to be added 
“knew or should have known” that it would have been named in the original 
action “but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.”53  Unlike 
Rule 15(c)’s notice requirement, which addresses a prospective defendant’s 
awareness of the original action, this subsection addresses the prospective 
defendant’s awareness that it was not named in the original action solely 
because of a mistake concerning its identity.54 
The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has 
elaborated on the requirements for relation back in its notes accompanying 
several amendments to the rule.  In its note to the 1966 amendment to Rule 
15(c), the Advisory Committee observed that relation back problems had 
commonly arisen in private actions against officers or agencies of the federal 
government.55  The Committee described situations in which plaintiffs 
brought suit before the statute of limitations expired but mistakenly named 
improper defendants, such as the United States, a recently retired Secretary, 
or a nonexistent agency such as the “Federal Security Administration.”56  
After learning of their mistakes, the plaintiffs moved to amend their 
complaints.  Their motions were denied on the ground that the statute of 
limitations had expired.57  The Committee characterized these decisions as 
“question-begging” and unresponsive to reality, stating that the denial of 
relation back under these circumstances robbed the plaintiffs of their 
opportunity to prove their cases.58  The Advisory Committee went on to 
explain that relation back should be allowed when the party to be brought in 
by amendment received timely notice of the action, formal or informal, such 
that it would not be prejudiced by defending against the claim, and knew or 
should have known that it would have been named in the original action but 
for the plaintiff’s mistake concerning the identity of the proper party.59 
Neither Rule 15 nor the Advisory Committee notes expressly defines 
“mistake” under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), but they do offer some guidance.60  
Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) clarifies that a mistake under the rule must concern the 
proper party’s identity.61  The note to the 1966 amendment describes various 
situations in which claimants “mistakenly” named improper government 
 
 52. See, e.g., Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 468–69 (4th Cir. 2007) (interpreting 
“change” to encompass additions because “an addition to something is generally regarded as 
a change to that thing”); see also Covey v. Assessor, 666 F. App’x 245, 247 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(“Rule 15(c)(1) requires that the party to be added to the action received timely notice . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
 53. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). 
 54. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 1498.3. 
 55. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15; id. r. 15 advisory committee’s notes to 1991 amendment; id. r. 
15 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment. 
 61. Id. r. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). 
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defendants.62  Similarly, the note to the 1991 amendment to Rule 15(c)(3) 
(now Rule 15(c)(1)(C)) provides an example of a mistake in its description 
of an amendment to correct “a formal defect such as misnomer or 
misidentification.”63  Thus, despite offering some general examples of 
mistakes under Rule 15(c), neither the Advisory Committee’s notes to the 
rule’s amendments nor the text of the rule itself clearly defines what qualifies 
as a mistake under the rule.64 
2.  The Supreme Court’s Interpretation 
of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) in Krupski 
In 2010, the Supreme Court addressed the knowledge-of-mistake 
requirement in Krupski.65  In February 2007, Wanda Krupski took a cruise 
on the Costa Magica, a ship owned and operated by the Italian corporation 
Costa Crociere S.p.A. (“Costa Crociere”).66  While on board, Krupski broke 
her leg when she tripped over a cable.67  Krupski sought counsel and, after 
attempts at settlement proved unsuccessful, filed a suit in the Southern 
District of Florida.68  The suit, which was filed three weeks before the statute 
of limitations expired, named Costa Cruise Lines (“Costa Cruise”), the 
Florida-based sales and marketing agent for Costa Crociere as a defendant.69  
Costa Cruise notified Krupski of Costa Crociere’s existence three times after 
the statute of limitations had expired:  first in its answer where it asserted that 
Costa Crociere was the actual operator of the ship, then in its corporate 
disclosure statement, which listed Costa Crociere as an interested party, and 
finally in a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Costa Crociere, 
not Costa Cruise, was the proper defendant.70  In response to Costa Cruise’s 
motion for summary judgment, Krupski produced the information that led 
her to believe Costa Cruise was the proper party, including the fact that Costa 
Cruise’s website listed its office in Florida as Costa Crociere’s U.S. office.71  
The district court granted Costa Cruise’s motion to dismiss but also granted 
Krupski leave to file an amended complaint.72 
Shortly thereafter, Krupski filed an amended complaint naming Costa 
Crociere as the defendant.73  In response, Costa Crociere moved to dismiss 
the complaint on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations 
because it did not relate back under Rule 15(c).74  The court granted the 
 
 62. See id. r. 15(c) advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment. 
 63. Id. r. 15(c) advisory committee’s notes to 1991 amendment. 
 64. See Leonard v. Parry, 219 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2000) (pointing to the examples offered 
by the Advisory Committee’s notes to the 1966 to confirm its interpretation of “mistake” in 
the context of Rule 15(c)). 
 65. Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A, 560 U.S. 538, 541 (2010). 
 66. Id. at 542. 
 67. Id. at 541. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 543. 
 70. Id. at 543–44. 
 71. Id. at 544. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 544–45. 
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motion, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in an unpublished per curiam 
opinion.75  The Eleventh Circuit found that, because the information relevant 
to the proper party’s identity was contained in Krupski’s cruise ticket, it was 
appropriate to impute the knowledge of the proper party’s identity to Krupski 
and her counsel.76  In other words, Krupski either knew or should have 
known the proper party’s identity before filing suit and therefore should be 
treated as having made a deliberate choice to sue one party over another.77  
The Eleventh Circuit further held that, even assuming Krupski did not learn 
of Costa Crociere as the proper party until Costa Cruise filed its answer, 
Krupski’s delay in filing an amended complaint justified the district court’s 
denial of relation back, regardless of whether Costa Crociere received 
sufficient notice of the action within the limitations period through its shared 
counsel and identity of interest with Costa Cruise.78 
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that neither of the Eleventh Circuit’s 
grounds for denying relation back was supported by the text of Rule 15(c).79  
The Court explained that the Eleventh Circuit “chose the wrong starting 
point” by focusing on Krupski’s knowledge in determining whether or not 
she had made a mistake under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).80  The proper inquiry, the 
Court explained, does not focus on what the plaintiff knew or should have 
known at the time of filing but instead on whether the prospective defendant 
knew or should have known that it would have been named as a defendant 
but for a mistake.81  Thus, the plaintiff’s knowledge is relevant only to the 
extent that it impacts the prospective defendant’s understanding of whether 
its omission from the original complaint was the result of a mistake 
concerning the proper party’s identity.82 
The Court also rejected Costa Crociere’s argument that the amended 
complaint did not relate back because Krupski unreasonably delayed filing it 
after learning of Costa Crociere’s existence.  The Court stated that Rule 
15(c)(1)(C) “plainly sets forth an exclusive list of requirements for relation 
back, and the amending party’s diligence is not among them.”83  Therefore, 
like the plaintiff’s knowledge, a delay in amending is relevant only to the 
extent that it impacts the prospective defendant’s knowledge that it would 
have been included in the original action but for a mistake concerning its 
identity.84 
The Court found this reading to be supported by the balance struck within 
relation back doctrine between defendants’ interests in repose after the 
expiration of the statute of limitations and the Federal Rules of Civil 
 
 75. Krupski v. Costa Cruise Lines, N.V., LLC, 330 F. App’x 892, 895–96 (11th Cir. 2009) 
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Procedure’s preference for “resolving disputes on their merits.”85  The Court 
noted that a defendant’s interest in repose is implicated most strongly when 
he legitimately believes that there has been no attempt to sue him within the 
limitations period, but that “repose would be a windfall for a prospective 
defendant who understood, or who should have understood, that he escaped 
suit during the limitations period only because the plaintiff misunderstood a 
crucial fact about his identity.”86 
In sum, Krupski directed courts to approach questions of relation back by 
focusing on a prospective defendant’s awareness that the plaintiff intended 
to name it in the action.87  By refocusing this inquiry, the Supreme Court 
invalidated plaintiff-focused approaches to relation back, holding that a 
plaintiff’s knowledge, or lack thereof, is relevant only insofar as it impacts 
the defendant’s awareness that it was meant to be sued.88 
B.  Relation Back and Policies Underlying Statutes of Limitations 
As the Advisory Committee note to the 1966 amendment of Rule 15 
observes, relation back is closely connected to the policies underlying 
statutes of limitations.89  Statutes of limitations set a time limit for bringing 
a claim based on the date the claim accrued and bar claims that are not 
brought within that period.90  They are “designed to promote justice by 
preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to 
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses 
have disappeared,” and they are supported by the theory that the right to be 
free from the indefinite possibility of defending against a claim eventually 
overcomes the right to bring even a meritorious claim.91  Statutes of 
limitations reflect a “value judgment concerning the point at which interests 
in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by interests in prohibiting 
the prosecution of stale ones.”92 
Statutes of limitations do not affect merely the “manner and the means” by 
which a person can vindicate substantive rights but rather create a substantive 
right themselves.93  Aside from the administrative aims of promoting judicial 
economy and requiring the diligent pursuit of claims, statutes of limitations 
also protect defendants’ rights to a speedy and fair adjudication and to the 
security that comes with certainty that one will not be called to defend against 
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 88. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 89. FED. R. CIV. P. 15 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment. 
 90. Statute of Limitations, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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an outstanding claim years in the future.94  These rights are referred to 
collectively as a defendant’s right to repose.95 
In applying relation back doctrine, courts often note the connection to 
statutes of limitations and express apprehension that too liberal an approach 
to relation back would allow plaintiffs to circumvent statutes of limitations’ 
protections of a prospective defendant’s right to repose.96  Thus, courts are 
generally protective of statute of limitations defenses because they recognize 
the need for defendants to be able to rely on the repose promised by a statute 
of limitations.97 
C.  John Doe Pleading:  From Fictional to Functional 
John Doe pleading has its roots in English common law, where plaintiffs 
used fictional characters to minimize the effects of writ pleading’s rigidity 
and to facilitate the pursuit of claims that did not fit into one of the 
predetermined categories that were the hallmark of that system.98  In the 
American system, John Doe pleading can be traced back to the Field 
Code99—David Field’s transformative overhaul of New York’s Code of Civil 
Procedure.100  The Field Code allowed a plaintiff that did not know the 
defendant’s name to designate that defendant by any name and to amend the 
pleading once the name was discovered.101  Thus, the shift to code pleading 
marked John Doe’s transformation from a legal fiction into a stand-in for an 
actual but unidentified person.102 
In contemporary civil litigation, John Doe pleading refers to the practice 
of naming intended but yet unidentified defendants as “John Doe.”103  This 
practice began in state courts, as many states adopted some form of the Field 
Code’s provision allowing unidentified defendants to be given fictitious 
names.104  The vast majority of states have adopted some provision for the 
use of fictitiously named defendants, whether by statute, in codes of civil 
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procedure, or by judicial decree.105  Only Connecticut, Delaware, and 
Louisiana expressly reject John Doe pleading in civil actions.106 
In contrast to the many state codes that address Doe pleading, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure are notoriously “silent on the matter.”107  Indeed, 
Carol Rice has argued that the Federal Rules “simply do not contemplate” a 
situation in which a plaintiff does not know the identity of the proper 
defendant.108  She notes that, while none of the federal rules address the 
matter directly, Rules 10(a) and 17(a) address the matter obliquely.109  Rule 
10(a) provides that the title of a complaint “must name all the parties.”110  
While this may seem inconsistent with Doe pleading, Rice notes that Rule 
10(a) is better interpreted as simply distinguishing the caption from the 
remainder of the complaint rather than establishing substantive rules related 
to name designation.111 
Rule 17(a) states that actions “must be prosecuted in the name of the real 
party in interest.”112  The Advisory Committee note to the 1966 amendment 
of this provision is the only explicit mention of John Doe parties in the federal 
rules.113  The note clarifies that, while the rule recognizes a broad class of 
parties as having standing as the real party in interest, the provision should 
not be construed to allow filing of an action in the name of a fictitious John 
Doe plaintiff to circumvent the statute of limitations by preserving a claim 
should a real victim come forward in the future.114  Rice argues that this rule 
requires only that a claim be prosecuted by the party whose interests are 
implicated and does not govern the name under which a person must 
prosecute the claim.115  Further, both Rule 17(a) and the Advisory 
Committee’s note refer to the use of fictional or nonexistent John Doe 
plaintiffs;116 neither appears to address the use of John Doe defendants as 
pseudonyms for real parties.117 
 
 105. Id. at 892 n.27. 
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Still, despite silence regarding the use of fictitious defendants in federal 
court, John Doe defendants are commonly named in complaints.118  While 
the use of fictitious defendants is not favored, courts have recognized their 
utility as stand-ins for real parties to afford plaintiffs the opportunity to 
identify unknown defendants through discovery.119  Thus, fictitious-name 
pleading is proper when it is reasonably likely that the discovery process will 
reveal the identity of the unknown defendant.120 
John Doe defendants play a special role in civil rights litigation.121  A well-
known example comes from the Supreme Court’s decision in Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,122 where the Court 
first recognized a cause of action against federal law enforcement agents who 
violate an individual’s constitutional rights.123  Bivens’s complaint did not 
name the specific federal agents allegedly involved in his unconstitutional 
arrest, but the district court ordered service against the agents indicated by 
the U.S. Attorney’s records to have been involved in the arrest.124  Thus, 
Bivens was able to discover the identities of those involved in his arrest with 
the district court’s help. 
Bivens is illustrative of the role that John Doe pleading plays for plaintiffs 
squaring off against large, institutional defendants, often in civil rights 
actions.  As scholars have noted, a plaintiff in such a case often faces a catch-
22:  before filing suit, she cannot enlist the court’s help through discovery 
requests or orders to discover the identity of unknown defendants, but she 
cannot file suit without naming a defendant.125  As Bivens demonstrates, the 
ability to sue defendants under fictitious names like John Doe can be critical 
to receiving the assistance necessary to discover the unknown defendant’s 
identity.126 
II.  PRE-KRUPSKI APPROACHES TO RELATION BACK 
FOR CLAIMS AGAINST JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS 
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Krupski, virtually all federal 
circuit courts had adopted the position that Rule 15(c) allowed relation back 
when a plaintiff misidentified a prospective defendant but not when the 
plaintiff lacked knowledge of the prospective defendant’s identity.  Courts 
thus routinely denied relation back on the ground that a plaintiff’s lack of 
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knowledge did not constitute a mistake under the rule.127  Only the Third and 
Fourth Circuits focused the inquiry on the prospective defendant’s notice of 
the action and knowledge of the plaintiff’s mistake,128 and only the Third 
Circuit interpreted Rule 15(c) to allow relation back for claims against John 
Doe defendants.129 
Part II of this Note examines the majority and minority approaches to this 
question.  Part II.A describes the majority approach to relation back for 
claims against John Doe defendants.  It discusses the textual and purpose-
based arguments supporting the majority’s interpretation that a lack of 
knowledge does not constitute a mistake under Rule 15(c).  Part II.B 
describes the slightly more permissive approach adopted by the Third and 
Fourth Circuits. 
A.  Majority Approach:  The John Doe Rule 
Pre-Krupski courts commonly advanced two lines of reasoning in denying 
relation back for claims against John Doe defendants.  The first was a simple 
textual argument that a lack of knowledge is not a mistake, so a plaintiff who 
names a John Doe defendant because she did not know the identity of the 
proper party at the time of filing the complaint has not made a “mistake” 
under Rule 15(c).130  The second was a purpose-based argument that 
emphasized the need to protect defendants’ interests created by statutes of 
limitations and was wary of plaintiffs’ use of John Doe pleading and relation 
back to circumvent these protections.131 
The pre-Krupski courts that prohibited relation back for claims against Doe 
defendants under Rule 15(c) relied on two related propositions based on the 
rule’s text:  First, Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) requires the plaintiff to have made a 
mistake concerning the proper party’s identity, separate from its requirement 
that the defendant know that, but for the mistake, it would have been named 
in the original action.  Second, a lack of knowledge of the identity of the 
proper party to be sued is not a mistake concerning the proper party.132 
The Seventh Circuit has articulated the basis for this rationale.  In 
Worthington v. Wilson,133 Richard Worthington sued Peoria Heights, Illinois, 
and three unknown police officers, alleging that he was assaulted by the 
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officers during an arrest.134  When Worthington amended his complaint to 
substitute officers Wilson and Wall for the unknown officers, the district 
court granted Wilson and Wall’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the 
statute of limitations had expired.135  In affirming the district court’s 
dismissal, the Seventh Circuit explained that Rule 15(c) allows relation back 
“only where there has been an error made concerning the identity of the 
proper party and where that party is chargeable with knowledge of the 
mistake”—not where the plaintiff lacks knowledge of the proper party’s 
identity.136  The court further held that, in the absence of such a mistake, it is 
irrelevant to the relation back analysis whether the party to be brought in 
knew or should have known that the plaintiff intended to name him in the 
original complaint, as the mistake requirement is a separate hurdle the 
plaintiff must clear before the court undertakes further analysis.137  
Worthington could not satisfy the mistake requirement of Rule 15(c), as his 
failure to name the defendants was the result of a lack of knowledge regarding 
their identity rather than a mistake in their names.138  Thus, there was no 
reason to undertake notice or knowledge analysis.  This rationale was 
advanced by other federal circuit courts in opinions affirming denials of 
relation back for the same reasons139 and has come to be known as the “John 
Doe rule.”140 
Courts adopting the John Doe rule pointed for support to the Advisory 
Committee notes to the 1966 and 1991 amendments to Rule 15(c), which 
added and clarified the rule’s mistake requirement.141  The 1991 Committee 
note clarified that an intended defendant with notice of the action within the 
Rule 4(m) period cannot “defeat the action on account of a defect in the 
pleading with respect to the defendant’s name” and that plaintiffs are 
permitted to amend a complaint to “correct a formal defect such as misnomer 
or misidentification.”142  This “misnomer or misidentification” language was 
repeated in numerous opinions denying relation back, as courts found that a 
lack of knowledge simply was not analogous to a misnomer or 
misidentification.143 
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In Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Department,144 for example, the Second 
Circuit affirmed the District of Connecticut’s dismissal of Elgin Barrow’s 
complaint against six individual officers in the Wethersfield Police 
Department as time barred because the amended complaint identifying the 
officers, previously named as John Does, was not filed until after the statute 
of limitations had expired.145  The Second Circuit interpreted the Advisory 
Committee’s inclusion of “misnomer or misidentification” in its note to the 
1991 amendment to imply that the rule only allowed the relation back of 
amendments necessary to cure such defects.146  Therefore, the plaintiff’s 
amendment to correct a lack of knowledge failed to satisfy the requirements 
of Rule 15(c).147  The other federal circuit courts have found this 
interpretation compelling—before Krupski, the vast majority held that an 
amendment correcting a lack of knowledge cannot relate back to the date of 
the original complaint because it fails to satisfy the mistake requirement of 
Rule 15(c).148 
In addition to the textual argument that a lack of knowledge does not 
constitute a mistake, these courts also relied on purpose-based reasoning in 
applying the John Doe rule—namely, that fictitious-name pleading cannot be 
used to undermine the balance struck by Rule 15(c) between a defendant’s 
interest in repose and a plaintiff’s interest in pursuing meritorious claims.149  
This reasoning reflects two main concerns. 
The first concern is an interest in discouraging plaintiffs from waiting until 
the last minute to file a complaint.  In Wayne v. Jarvis,150 for example, Frank 
Wayne filed a pro se § 1983 claim against Georgia’s DeKalb County 
Sheriff’s Department and a number of individual sheriffs, including seven 
John Doe defendants, after he was attacked by fellow inmates at the DeKalb 
County Jail.151  In affirming the district court’s denial of Wayne’s motion to 
amend the complaint to name specific deputy sheriffs after the statute of 
limitations had run, the Eleventh Circuit criticized the plaintiff’s decision to 
wait to file suit until two weeks before the statute of limitations was set to 
expire.152  The court described the plaintiff’s problem as one created by his 
own failure to comply with a deadline imposed by law and stated that he must 
“bear[] the consequences of his own delay.”153  The court further suggested 
that, had Wayne filed his complaint earlier, he would have been able to 
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discover the officers’ identities prior to the expiration of the statute of 
limitations.154 
Courts adopting the John Doe rule also expressed concern that an overly 
permissive approach to Rule 15(c) would undermine the purposes served by 
statutes of limitations, specifically the protection of defendants’ interest in 
repose.155  These courts found this right implicated in amendments 
identifying John Doe defendants after the statute of limitations had run.156  In 
Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim,157 for example, then-D.C. Circuit Judge Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg asserted that a prospective defendant not named in a suit 
prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations is entitled to repose “unless 
it is or should be apparent to that person that he is the beneficiary of a mere 
slip of the pen, as it were.”158  Allowing amendments identifying defendants 
previously named as John Doe, then, would allow plaintiffs to preserve a 
claim indefinitely by filing a complaint against a fictitious party without any 
requirement that the plaintiff amend the complaint before the expiration of 
the statute of limitations.159  For these reasons, courts often found that a broad 
interpretation of the mistake requirement in this context would deprive a 
defendant of his right to repose without serving the purpose of Rule 15(c), 
that is, “to avoid the harsh consequences of a mistake that is neither 
prejudicial nor a surprise to the misnamed party.”160 
Not all courts adopting the John Doe rule categorically barred relation back 
in the context of John Doe pleading.  Rather, one principal exception to the 
rule emerged where the plaintiff’s inability to identify the John Doe 
defendant was attributable to action (or inaction) by the defendant.161  In Byrd 
v. Abate,162 often cited as the case creating this exception,163 William Byrd 
filed suit against the Commissioner of the New York City Department of 
Correction, the Warden and Deputy Warden of Riker’s Island, the Mayor of 
New York City, and a John Doe correction officer, after an attack by a fellow 
inmate resulted in the loss of Byrd’s left eye.164  Despite Byrd’s numerous 
attempts to discover the identity of the John Doe officer on duty at the time 
of the attack, Corporation Counsel refused to disclose records until the court 
bifurcated the trial for the claims against the individual officer.165  Even after 
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the court ordered bifurcation, Corporation Counsel did not produce 
documents identifying Wade Hults as the officer on duty for over six months, 
which allowed the statute of limitations for the claims against him to 
expire.166  In finding that Byrd’s amended complaint related back, the court 
noted that “it was the defense, rather than the plaintiff, who failed to identify 
the individual defendant despite Byrd’s requests for that information.”167  
The court emphasized that the relevant information was “uniquely within the 
knowledge of Corporation Counsel,” who withheld it until after the 
limitations period had run.168  Other courts, mainly in the Second Circuit, 
now recognize an exception to the John Doe rule when a defendant impedes 
a plaintiff’s attempts to discover the proper party’s identity before the 
expiration of the statute of limitations.169 
B.  Minority Approach:  A Focus on the Defendant’s Knowledge 
As discussed above, the majority of federal circuit courts focused on Rule 
15(c)’s mistake language to bar relation back for claims against John Doe 
defendants prior to Krupski and found that a plaintiff’s lack of knowledge did 
not qualify as a mistake.170  The Third and Fourth Circuits, however, focused 
their inquiries on the defendant’s knowledge instead.171 
In Varlack, the Third Circuit became the only court of appeals to allow 
relation back for claims against John Doe defendants.172  The case involved 
an altercation between Varlack and the night manager of an Orange Julius 
restaurant who denied Varlack entry to the restaurant when it was closing.173  
Varlack alleged that during the fight he fell through a window and sustained 
an injury to his arm that required amputation eight inches below the 
shoulder.174  Varlack sued Orange Julius and an “Unknown Employee” and 
later moved to amend the complaint to identify the employee as Bernette 
Cannings after the statute of limitations had expired.175  In holding that 
Varlack’s amendment related back, the Third Circuit noted that Cannings had 
previously testified that he was aware of the suit and knew that Unknown 
Employee referred to him.176  The court found that this knowledge was 
sufficient to satisfy Rule 15(c)’s requirement that the party to be brought in 
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by amendment know that, but for a mistake, it would have been named in the 
original action.177 
Subsequently, in Singletary v. Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections,178 Chief Judge Becker of the Third Circuit noted that the weight 
of authority in other federal circuit courts did not favor such an interpretation 
but suggested that the John Doe rule was subject to both epistemological and 
semantic challenges.179  The Singletary court instead affirmed the district 
court’s refusal to allow an amendment identifying John Doe defendants on 
the ground that the parties to be brought in by amendment had not received 
timely notice of the action, thus avoiding having to address what the court 
described as “sticky issues” relating to the relation back of claims against 
John Doe defendants.180  Despite denying relation back under the 
circumstances, however, the court dedicated a long footnote to arguing that 
the Rules Advisory Committee should amend Rule 15(c) to make clear that 
it permits the relation back of amendments identifying John Doe 
defendants.181 
The Fourth Circuit similarly focused its inquiry on the defendant’s 
knowledge, while continuing to preclude relation back for claims against 
John Doe defendants.  In Goodman v. Praxair, Inc.,182 the Fourth Circuit 
reversed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s amendment adding 
Praxair Services, Inc., Praxair, Inc.’s wholly owned subsidiary, on the ground 
that it was barred by the statute of limitations.183  The court rejected the 
defendants’ argument that the plaintiff had not made a mistake under Rule 
15(c).  It held that the lower court’s interpretation of the rule improperly 
focused on the type of mistake without fully considering notice and prejudice 
to the party to be brought in by amendment.184  Specifically, the court held 
that the relation back inquiry “does not concern itself with the amending 
party’s particular state of mind except insofar as he made a mistake” but 
rather “focuses on the notice to the new party and the effect on the new party 
that the amendment will have” and that the mistake language is confined to 
describing the prospective defendant’s notice and understanding.185 
The Fourth Circuit also found that the mistake requirement is not the 
proper vehicle for addressing concerns about plaintiffs circumventing 
statutes of limitations by filing an action against fictitious defendants with 
the plan of amending after the opportunity for discovery.186  Instead, the court 
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found that the notice and prejudice requirements adequately protect a 
defendant’s interest in repose.187  Thus, because Praxair Services, Inc. knew 
or should have known within the limitations period that it was the proper 
party to the suit and had suffered no prejudice, the amendment adding it as a 
party related back to the original complaint.188  The Goodman court, 
however, explicitly stated that this approach to relation back would continue 
to preclude relation back for claims against John Doe defendants as such 
amendments would likely result in prejudice to the new party or would be 
unable to satisfy the knowledge-of-mistake requirement.189 
In Robinson v. Clipse,190 the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed this approach to 
relation back.191  Plaintiff Tyrone Robinson filed a pro se complaint against 
the South Carolina Department of Public Safety and Highway Patrol after 
being shot by Trooper Joseph Franklin Clipse at the termination of a high-
speed chase.192  The district court originally dismissed the action on the 
ground that the department could not be held liable under a theory of 
respondeat superior and that qualified immunity prevented Trooper Clipse 
from being sued in his individual capacity.193  The Fourth Circuit vacated 
that order,194 but on remand the district court granted Clipse’s motion for 
summary judgment on the ground that Robinson’s claims against him, 
asserted for the first time in the amended complaint, were barred by the 
statute of limitations.195  Noting its rejection of a formalistic interpretation of 
Rule 15(c)’s mistake requirement in Goodman, the court explained that the 
mistake language simply described the new party’s notice or knowledge.196  
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Robinson’s 
amended complaint naming Trooper Clipse as a defendant after the statute of 
limitations had run.197  Because Clipse had notice within the limitation period 
that he was the party Robinson intended to sue, the Fourth Circuit explained, 
the amendment related back under Rule 15(c).198 
While neither Goodman nor Robinson involved an amendment identifying 
a defendant previously sued as John Doe, the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning, like 
that of the Third Circuit, differed meaningfully from the approach taken by 
the majority of the federal circuit courts, which adopt the John Doe rule.  The 
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Third and Fourth Circuits focused on the prospective defendant’s notice and 
knowledge rather than on whether the amendment sought to rectify the 
plaintiff’s misidentification or lack of knowledge.199  Thus, the Third and 
Fourth Circuits interpreted the mistake requirement as inquiring into what the 
prospective defendant knew about the action and his intended involvement 
in it, rather than as a distinct and dispositive factor separate from any analysis 
of the prospective defendant’s notice or knowledge.200  The Supreme Court 
validated this approach to relation back in Krupski when it held that the 
knowledge-of-mistake requirement in Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) addresses the 
defendant’s knowledge that it would have been named in the original action 
but for a mistake concerning its identity, and that the plaintiff’s knowledge is 
relevant only insofar as it affects the defendant’s understanding.201 
III.  KRUPSKI AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSPECTIVE 
After Krupski, courts have reached differing conclusions as to whether the 
decision mandates a new approach to relation back for claims against John 
Doe defendants.  Disagreement exists over Krupski’s applicability to relation 
back for such claims.  This Part explores the disagreement and the arguments 
advanced in favor of the majority and minority approaches. 
A.  A Split over the Breadth of Krupksi’s Impact 
While Krupski did not involve claims against John Doe defendants, 
scholars have noted that the Court’s reasoning in the decision is likely 
relevant to such claims, as the Court’s focus on the prospective defendant’s 
knowledge appears to conflict with an approach to relation back that focuses 
primarily on determining whether the plaintiff’s knowledge, or lack thereof, 
can be considered a mistake.202  While some courts have held that Krupski 
controls in the context of John Doe defendants, most continue to apply the 
John Doe rule.203  This tension has led to a split, both across circuits and 
between district courts within the same circuit, as to the proper interpretation 
of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) in the context of claims against John Doe defendants. 
1.  The Majority’s Narrow Interpretation of Krupski 
Since Krupski, only three federal circuit courts have directly considered 
the decision’s impact on the John Doe rule, and each has determined that, 
even in light of the decision, Rule 15(c) continues to preclude relation back 
for claims against John Doe defendants.204  The Sixth Circuit was the first to 
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address the question in 2012 and held in an unreported opinion that even after 
Krupski, Rule 15(c) did not allow relation back for identification of 
defendants originally named as John Doe.205  Similarly, the Second Circuit 
has also retained its pre-Krupski approach by holding that amendments 
identifying John Doe defendants do not correct a mistake of fact and, thus, 
do not relate back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C).206  In 2017, the Eighth Circuit held 
that naming a John Doe defendant is not a “mistake” and that the Supreme 
Court’s analysis in Krupski does not expand the definition of mistake to 
include a lack of knowledge.207 
As discussed above, courts adopting the John Doe rule do not deny relation 
back whenever a plaintiff does not know the identity of all intended 
defendants.208  Wyatt v. Owens209 illuminates the nuance of this approach.  
There, Michael Owens alleged excessive force during his arrest in a pro se 
§ 1983 action against officers Johnny Owens, Allen Shelton, William Harris, 
Scott Wyatt, and M.D. Pickeral.210  Defendants Harris and Pickeral 
succeeded in moving for summary judgment as they each had been 
misidentified by Wyatt at the time he filed his complaint and neither was 
actually present at Wyatt’s arrest.211  After retaining counsel, Wyatt filed an 
unopposed motion to amend his complaint under Rule 15 to replace Harris 
and Pickeral with officers Thomas Nicholson and Robert Wolsham.212  
Nicholson and Wolsham moved for summary judgment on the theory that the 
claims against them were barred by the statute of limitations; because 
Wyatt’s error did not qualify as a “mistake” under Rule 15(c), the claims 
could not relate back to the original complaint.213  In denying the motion, the 
court found that Wyatt’s misidentification of the officers was the 
“quintessential type of mistake contemplated by Rule 15(c).”214  Because 
Wyatt incorrectly named two actual officers, instead of using fictitious names 
as placeholders, his misidentification qualified as a mistake under the rule.215 
In addition to the exception described in Part II.A.3 above, courts adopting 
the John Doe rule have begun to recognize another exception to the John Doe 
rule since Krupski.  This exception allows relation back for claims against 
John Doe defendants under Rule 15(c)(1)(A), which permits relation back 
when the law providing the statute of limitations allows relation back for such 
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claims.216  In the context of state claims being tried in federal court or of 
claims arising under § 1983, which derive their statutes of limitations from 
state law, courts applying this exception look to the rules of procedure in the 
relevant state.217  Thus, in the event that the state rules of civil procedure 
allow relation back for claims against John Doe defendants, relation back 
may be permitted pursuant to Rule 15(c)(1)(A).218 
2.  The Minority’s Broader Interpretation of Krupski 
In contrast to the approach described above, a number of district courts, 
largely in the Seventh Circuit,219 have found that, by refocusing the inquiry 
under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), Krupski marked a “doctrinal change in the law of 
relation back.”220  These courts apply Krupski to allow relation back for 
amendments identifying John Doe defendants.221  In addition to finding this 
approach supported by both the Supreme Court’s guidance in Krupski and by 
the text of Rule 15(c), these courts are also persuaded that this interpretation 
of Rule 15(c) is more consistent with the purpose of the rule.222  Other courts 
have applied Krupski in finding the mistake requirement satisfied but denied 
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relation back on the ground that the prospective defendants did not have 
adequate notice of the suit.223  Still other courts, without deciding the issue 
definitively, have suggested that Krupski undermines the John Doe rule.224 
Courts adopting this approach do not allow relation back any time a 
plaintiff seeks to amend a complaint to identify John Doe defendants.  Rather, 
these courts recognize a difference between amendments that identify 
prospective defendants that were originally identified with reasonable 
specificity in the complaint and those where John Doe defendants seemed to 
serve as placeholders not tied to any identifiable party.225  In McKnight v. 
Iceberg Enterprises LLC,226 for example, the district court allowed the 
plaintiff to amend her complaint after the limitations period had expired to 
identify Mid-Continent Distributors, Inc. and Mid-Continent Distributors, 
LLC as John Doe Chair Manufacturer and John Doe Chair Distributor.227  In 
explaining why the Fourth Circuit’s pronouncement in Goodman that 
“naming Doe defendants self-evidently is no mistake [under Rule 15]” would 
not preclude relation back, the court noted that Mid-Continent received 
service of the complaint within the Rule 4(m) period, that McKnight’s 
complaint stated that she would amend the complaint when the name of the 
defendant-manufacturer was discovered, and that Mid-Continent was on 
notice that McKnight was injured when she sat on the chair.228  Thus, the 
court reasoned, “the liberal amendment policies of the Federal Rules 
favor[ed] relation back” under the circumstances.229 
Similarly, in Solivan v. Dart,230 the court allowed relation back of an 
amendment identifying John Doe corrections officers in reckless indifference 
claims arising out of an incident where Solivan, the only Hispanic inmate in 
a majority African American tier of Cook County Department of Corrections 
maximum security housing, was severely beaten by African American 
inmates and left untended by corrections staff for nearly three hours.231  The 
court noted that Solivan displayed diligence by timely filing his complaint, 
repeatedly seeking the names of the John Doe officers, and identifying the 
John Does as specifically as he could “based on their shift times on specific 
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dates and at specific posts in the [division] and based on the incident log 
number for his injuries.”232  Given this specificity, it was clear that the 
officers identified in this way knew or should have known that Solivan 
intended to name them in his suit.233  Unlike a plaintiff asserting claims 
against named defendants and numerous unidentifiable John Does,234 
Solivan used John Doe designations to refer as specifically as possible to 
intended defendants that he was not yet able to identify.235 
In contrast, in Haroon v. Talbott,236 the court denied relation back for an 
amendment identifying a John Doe defendant who was omitted as a party 
from the caption of the complaint, merely described in the complaint’s body 
as an unknown driver and agent of the named defendant, and excluded from 
the complaint’s request for relief against the named defendant.237  The court 
found that while relation back is not categorically unavailable to a plaintiff 
who lacks the knowledge of the proper party’s identity, relation back will be 
denied when the content of the original complaint and the plaintiff’s post-
filing conduct create the impression that the initial failure to name the 
prospective defendant was intentional.238  Thus, courts adopting this more 
permissive approach to relation back after Krupski use Rule 15(c)’s notice 
and knowledge requirements as a mechanism for filtering claims against John 
Doe defendants that properly relate back from those that do not.239 
B.  Textual, Precedential, and Purpose-Based Arguments 
for the Narrow and Broad Interpretations of Krupski 
Courts adopting both interpretations of Krupski’s impact on relation back 
doctrine have advanced various arguments in favor of each approach.  This 
Part examines the textual, precedential, and purpose-based arguments 
supporting both interpretations.   
1.  Textual Arguments for Each Approach 
After Krupski, some courts continue to rely on pre-Krupski interpretations 
of Rule 15(c)’s mistake requirement without addressing Krupski, while 
others explicitly distinguish the plaintiff’s position in Krupski from that of a 
plaintiff naming John Doe defendants.240  Under either approach, the 
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underlying rationale is consistent with pre-Krupski interpretations of the 
mistake requirement:  a lack of knowledge simply is not a mistake.241 
These courts retain the reasoning articulated in pre-Krupski decisions and 
continue to interpret Rule 15(c)’s mistake requirement as excluding 
situations in which a plaintiff lacked knowledge concerning the proper 
party’s identity.242  In Heglund, for example, the Eighth Circuit found that 
Krupski did not justify an expansion of “mistake” to include the naming of 
John Doe defendants as the Court in Krupski, unlike those considering 
amendments identifying John Doe defendants, “was not confronted with an 
intentional error by a plaintiff that is incompatible with the very definition[] 
of ‘mistake.’”243  Courts adopting this approach continue to hold that 
satisfying the mistake requirement is an independent and necessary step 
before analyzing whether the prospective defendant knew it should have been 
named in the original complaint.244  Thus, these courts find that Krupski has 
not expanded Rule 15(c) to capture a situation where a plaintiff lacks the 
knowledge of the proper party’s identity.245 
The main textual justification for this approach comes from the plain 
meaning of the word “mistake,” which courts adopting the John Doe rule 
define as a “misunderstanding, wrong decision, or inadvertent wrong 
action.”246  These courts rely on both lay and legal dictionaries in reaching 
the conclusion that “mistake” implies a lack of intentionality that is simply 
irreconcilable with an intentional use of a John Doe designation to accurately 
convey a lack of knowledge of a party’s identity.247  Thus, these courts reason 
that, regardless of the policy arguments in favor of permitting relation back 
under these circumstances, the text of the rule simply does not permit such 
an interpretation.248 
A number of district courts, however, find that Krupski has mandated a 
reinterpretation of Rule 15(c)’s mistake requirement.  In White v. City of 
Chicago,249 Willie White, a pro se plaintiff, filed a complaint under § 1983 
alleging violations of his constitutional rights after an unknown police officer 
pushed him down a flight of stairs while handcuffed, causing him to separate 
his shoulder.250  Although White received some records from the City of 
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Chicago in response to discovery requests, these did not reveal the identity 
of the officer that pushed him down the stairs.251  After receiving court-
appointed counsel and at the court’s suggestion, White filed a second 
amended complaint adding as defendants all of the officers that appeared in 
the records White had received.252  While this saved White’s § 1983 claims 
from being time barred, the individual defendants moved to dismiss certain 
state law claims that had expired five months before the amended complaint 
was filed.253 
In determining whether these state claims would relate back, the court 
relied heavily on Krupski.  The court found that Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) could 
not be interpreted to preclude relation back for claims against John Doe 
defendants after Krupski because such an interpretation would rely on the 
plaintiff’s knowledge without examining the defendant’s knowledge—an 
approach that had been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court.254  The 
court noted that, while Krupski involved a plaintiff’s knowledge of a party’s 
existence, claims against John Doe defendants involve a lack of knowledge 
of the proper party’s identity.255  Still, the court reasoned, there was no reason 
to assume that the Supreme Court would treat the two situations differently 
because Krupski had rejected as the central relation back inquiry not only 
what the plaintiff knew but what the plaintiff should have known.256  For 
support, the court further pointed to the Krupski court’s definition of mistake, 
which included not only error, misconception, or misunderstanding, but also 
inadequate knowledge and inattention.257  The court found the reference to 
“inadequate knowledge” to support the extension of Krupski’s reasoning to 
the lack of knowledge resulting in John Doe designations.258  Other courts 
have similarly found that Krupski’s interpretation of Rule 15(c) supports the 
notion that a lack of knowledge concerning a defendant’s identity can 
constitute a mistake.259 
The main textual justification for this approach comes from Krupski’s 
definition of mistake in conjunction with its guidance that the proper inquiry 
under relation back is whether the prospective defendant knew or should have 
known that, but for a mistake, the plaintiff would have named him in the 
original action—not what the plaintiff knew at the time of filing the 
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complaint.260  These courts point to the inclusion of “inadequate knowledge” 
in Krupski’s definition of mistake as an indication that “mistake” under Rule 
15(c) can include a lack of knowledge concerning the proper party’s 
identity.261  In light of this definition of mistake, these courts find that the 
interpretation articulated in Heglund fails to follow the text of Rule 15(c), as 
well as the Supreme Court’s guidance, by continuing to employ a plaintiff-
focused inquiry and relying on an underinclusive definition of mistake.262 
2.  Precedential Arguments for Each Approach 
Courts continuing to apply the John Doe rule have found that the decision 
does not undermine pre-Krupski precedent interpreting Rule 15(c)(1) as 
having a mistake requirement separate from its notice and knowledge 
requirements.263  In Terry v. Chicago Police Department,264 for example, the 
district court in the Northern District of Illinois cited Worthington and other 
pre-Krupski cases from the Seventh Circuit to support the proposition that 
“Rule 15(c)(1) contains a ‘mistake’ requirement that is independent from the 
determination of whether the new party knew that the action would be 
brought against it.”265  Therefore, the court held, because the plaintiff’s lack 
of knowledge of the proper defendant’s identity did not constitute a mistake, 
relation back was unavailable.266  The court further held that the plaintiff’s 
reliance on Krupski was misguided, as the plaintiff did not “make the type of 
mistake of fact at issue in [Krupski].”267  Thus, the absence of such a mistake 
ended the inquiry, and analysis under the notice and knowledge portions of 
Rule 15(c)(1) was irrelevant.268 
Similarly, in Dominguez v. City of New York,269 the district court in the 
Eastern District of New York declined to interpret Krupski as overruling the 
Second Circuit’s precedent in Barrow that a lack of knowledge did not 
constitute a mistake.270  The court explained that “Krupski merely picks up 
where Barrow left off.  Barrow asked whether a mistake has been committed; 
Krupski assumes the presence of a mistake and asks whether it is covered by 
Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).”271  Like the court in Terry, the court in Dominguez 
separated Rule 15(c)’s mistake analysis from its notice and knowledge 
analysis and found that Krupski is relevant only to the latter.272 
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Courts rejecting the John Doe rule in light of Krupski, however, have found 
that this pre-Krupski precedent is no longer good law.273  In White, for 
example, the court rejected the argument that Krupski does not affect prior 
decisions precluding relation back for claims against John Doe defendants 
because such claims involve a lack of knowledge rather than a factual 
mistake.274  The court reasoned that the Seventh Circuit had already rejected 
such a distinction in Hall v. Norfolk Southern Railway275 when it held that 
the distinction between a plaintiff’s ignorance of and misunderstanding about 
a party’s liability for an injury creates no meaningful difference in the relation 
back analysis as neither is a mistake concerning the defendant’s identity 
under Rule 15(c).276  The White court further pointed to the Seventh Circuit’s 
assertion in Joseph v. Elan Motorsports Technologies Racing Corp.277 that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Krupski had “cut the ground out from under” 
Hall’s view that a misunderstanding could not constitute a mistake under 
Rule 15(c).  The court reasoned that the decision similarly must have cut the 
ground out from under an interpretation that ignorance could not constitute a 
mistake.  It held that the rationale underlying the exclusion of either from the 
definition of “mistake” ultimately depends improperly on the amending 
party’s knowledge rather than that of the prospective defendant.278  Thus, the 
White court found that Krupski undermined Seventh Circuit precedent that 
mandated adherence to the John Doe rule.279  Other courts have also found 
that Krupski undermines John Doe rule precedent by rejecting distinctions 
within relation back analysis that rely on the plaintiff’s knowledge and not 
that of the prospective defendant.280 
3.  Purpose-Based Arguments for Each Approach 
After Krupski, courts retaining the majority John Doe rule continue to 
advance the purpose-based arguments in favor of the approach set forth in 
Wayne, Nassim, and other pre-Krupski decisions.281  These courts maintain 
that plaintiffs who wait to file their complaints until several days before the 
expiration of the statute of limitations and are unable to discover the John 
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Does’ identities within the limitation period should be left to bear the 
consequences of their own delay.282  Additionally, courts adopting the John 
Doe rule argue that this approach is supported by the purpose of Rule 15(c), 
which protects defendants’ interest in repose by preventing plaintiffs from 
circumventing statutes of limitations through the use of John Doe 
designations.283 
The courts that have changed their approach to relation back in light of 
Krupski, however, find not only that Krupski mandates a reinterpretation of 
“mistake” but also that such a reinterpretation is supported by the purposes 
of Rule 15, and the policies underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
more broadly.284  In Haroon, for example, the court pointed to Krupski’s 
statement of the purpose of relation back as “balanc[ing] the interests of the 
defendant protected by the statute of limitations with the preference 
expressed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in general, and Rule 15 in 
particular, for resolving disputes on their merits.”285  The court also focused 
on Krupski’s observation that Rule 15(c) protects a prospective defendant’s 
legitimate interest in repose but that repose “would be a windfall for a 
prospective defendant who understood, or should have understood, that he 
escaped suit during the limitations period only because the plaintiff 
misunderstood a crucial fact about his identity.”286 
In light of this guidance from Krupski, the Haroon court concluded that 
interpreting Krupski to allow relation back for claims against John Doe 
defendants, provided that the notice and knowledge requirements are met, 
best serves the purposes of relation back doctrine by striking the appropriate 
balance between a defendant’s interest in repose and the Federal Rules’ 
preference for resolving disputes on their merits.287  The court also noted that 
the plaintiff-focused reasoning advanced to support the continued application 
of the John Doe rule unjustifiably treats plaintiffs with inadequate knowledge 
much more harshly than plaintiffs who simply identify the wrong defendant 
in the original complaint.288  Finally, courts adopting this approach reason 
that, by focusing on the defendant’s knowledge, the approach does not 
undermine prospective defendants’ legitimate interest in repose as they are 
in the same position as a defendant sued within the limitations period and 
suffer no harm by omission from the original complaint.289  Thus, these 
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courts find that focusing the analysis under Rule 15(c) on the defendant’s 
knowledge best harmonizes the Supreme Court’s analysis in Krupski with the 
purpose of relation back.290 
IV.  A BETTER WAY 
After Krupski, courts should adopt the approach described in Part III.A.2 
and allow relation back for claims against John Doe defendants, provided that 
the other requirements of Rule 15(c) are met.  This approach is supported by 
the text and purpose of Rule 15(c) as well as the Supreme Court’s guidance 
in Krupski, and is consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
generally. 
The majority’s definition of “mistake” as implying a lack of intentionality 
that may be inconsistent with the intentional use of John Doe designations is 
supported by lay and legal dictionaries.291  Still, such close scrutiny of the 
word “mistake,” without broader reference to the other provisions within 
Rule 15(c), results in an excessively formalistic interpretation that is not 
mandated by the rule’s text.292 
As an initial matter, Krupski’s definition of mistake to include “inadequate 
knowledge” challenges the majority’s narrow definition.293  Further, by 
focusing unnecessarily on the meaning of “mistake,” proponents of the John 
Doe rule read into Rule 15(c) a distinction between its mistake requirement 
and its knowledge requirement that is unsupported by the text of the Rule.294  
The Supreme Court described the central inquiry under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) 
as whether the prospective defendant knew or should have known during the 
Rule 4(m) period that it would have been named in the original action were 
it not for a mistake concerning its identity.295  Wright & Miller’s treatise on 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure supports this interpretation.  It describes 
Rule 15 has having a “knowledge of mistake” requirement and not a 
“knowledge” requirement and a “mistake” requirement.296  Thus, Rule 
15(c)(1)(C)(ii) is best understood as having a single requirement:  the party 
to be brought in by amendment knew or should have known that it was not 
named in the complaint solely because the plaintiff had inaccurate or 
incomplete information concerning its identity.  Relatedly, the minority 
approach to relation back for claims against John Doe defendants 
appropriately recognizes that much of the reasoning upon which continued 
application of the John Doe rule relies, both for its definition of mistake and 
for its interpretation of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), has been undermined by 
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Krupski’s rejection of an inquiry under the rule that focuses on what a 
plaintiff knew at the time of filing.297 
This approach is also better supported by the purpose of Rule 15(c).298  
Under the majority’s approach, plaintiffs that lack the knowledge of the 
proper party are treated significantly more harshly than those that 
misunderstand which party is responsible for their injuries.299  This outcome 
does not protect a defendant’s legitimate right to repose, nor is it consistent 
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.300 
Policies underlying statutes of limitations are not implicated by an 
amendment identifying a previously unidentified party who timely received 
sufficient notice of his status as an intended defendant and faces no prejudice 
by having not been identified in the original complaint.301  As the Supreme 
Court observed in Krupski, “repose would be a windfall for a prospective 
defendant who understood, or who should have understood, that he escaped 
suit during the limitations period only because the plaintiff misunderstood a 
crucial fact about his identity.”302  To free intended defendants from the 
obligation to defend against potentially meritorious claims solely on the 
ground that the plaintiff lacked knowledge of their identities, instead of 
misperceiving their identities, overprotects an interest in repose that is neither 
warranted nor faithful to the Rules’ preference for resolving disputes on their 
merits.303 
The majority approach also results in a paradox in which cases with similar 
sets of facts reach fundamentally different outcomes.  In Wyatt, the court 
found that because Wyatt incorrectly named two real but ultimately 
uninvolved officers, instead of using fictitious names as placeholders for 
defendants whose identities he had not yet discovered, his misidentification 
qualified as a “quintessential” mistake under Rule 15(c).304  However, had 
Wyatt been aware of his lack of knowledge and named John Doe defendants 
instead, his claims would likely have been barred by the statute of 
limitations.305  The arbitrariness of this disparity in outcomes is remarkable 
given the similarity of the circumstances.  In both situations, Wyatt would 
have known the identities of some, but not all, of the individuals involved in 
his encounter with law enforcement, the only difference being his own 
awareness of his lack of knowledge.  To dismiss the claims in one instance 
while allowing the case to proceed in another clearly seems to constitute a 
result based on a technicality, an outcome disfavored by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.306  Further, recognizing a legally significant difference 
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between the two situations ultimately requires focusing on the plaintiff’s 
knowledge at the time of filing the complaint, which the Supreme Court has 
identified as “the wrong starting point.”307 
Disparate treatment of such similar situations also creates troubling 
incentives for plaintiffs and puts the current interpretation of Rule 15(c) in 
tension with Rule 11’s requirement that all factual contentions contained in 
a pleading have evidentiary support or are likely to have support after an 
opportunity for investigation or discovery.308  Under the majority approach, 
it is not unreasonable to expect a plaintiff to conclude that she is better off 
naming someone in the original complaint, as opposed to using a John Doe 
designation with the hope of discovering the party’s identity, in order to avoid 
dismissal of the entire action if she is unable to do so within the limitations 
period.  While such a pleading violates Rule 11 in that it does not, to the best 
of the plaintiff’s knowledge or belief, contain factual allegations supported 
by evidence,309 the violation would likely be hard to prove.  In this way, the 
majority interpretation potentially incentivizes bad faith misidentifications 
by punishing plaintiffs who are aware of and candid about their lack of 
information, despite their situational similarity with plaintiffs who are 
ignorant of their own lack of knowledge.  Thus, aside from its tension with 
the Supreme Court’s approach to Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) and the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure generally, this approach creates incentives for plaintiffs 
that run counter to the requirements under Rule 11. 
The minority approach to Rule 15(c) also standardizes relation back 
doctrine by eliminating the need for various exceptions to the John Doe rule 
to avoid inequitable outcomes.310  By focusing the question under Rule 
15(c)(1)(C)(ii) on the prospective defendant’s knowledge, the minority 
approach allows courts to screen claims against John Doe defendants that 
should properly be dismissed when the policies underlying statutes of 
limitations are implicated through a robust notice inquiry that results in the 
dismissal of claims when a prospective defendant reasonably could have 
concluded that the plaintiff did not intend to name him in the suit,311 while 
allowing claims to proceed when such policies are not implicated.312  Thus, 
the minority approach allows courts to reach this outcome through a single, 
standardized approach, while the majority does it through a patchwork of 
exceptions.313 
CONCLUSION 
After Krupski, the John Doe rule should be abandoned in favor of an 
approach that better balances the competing interests protected by the relation 
back doctrine—namely, a defendant’s interest in repose and the Federal 
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Rules’ goal of facilitating the disposition of claims on their merits.  By 
interpreting Rule 15(c) to allow relation back for claims against John Doe 
defendants when the other requirements are met, courts can screen claims 
against defendants with a legitimate interest in repose, while avoiding the 
dismissal of meritorious claims based on a technicality.  This approach is 
supported by the text and purpose of Rule 15(c) as well as by Supreme Court 
precedent interpreting the rule, and it is more consistent with the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure generally. 
 
